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Transnational theories of order and change:
heterodoxy in International Relations
scholarship
RONEN PALAN*
Abstract. In this article I argue that the very meaning of ‘inter-national relations’ is emerging as
a focus of debate in International Relations, particularly among the critical traditions in the
discipline. No longer seen as a mere study of peace and war, IR is viewed as a component of
general pan-disciplinary theories or order and change. The international sphere is perceived,
accordingly, no longer as a system in its own right, but rather as a gigantic transmission belt,
and a huge communication device transmitting and diﬀusing ideas, practices, rules, norms and
institutions throughout the world. The article examines the implications of such an approach on
IR theory. In addition, the article revisits the works of Hegel, Marx and the French School of
Regulation to demonstrate how they developed an empirical theory of international diﬀusion.
This special issue of the Review of International Studies aims to evaluate the impact
and likely future direction of the so-called critical tradition in International Relations
scholarship. But what precisely is this critical tradition? Is there one tradition, or a
variety of traditions? Is it not the case that all theories and approaches are supposed
to be critical? And who exactly has the right to proclaim themselves ‘critical’, and in
doing so, by default pronounce their intellectual opponents uncritical?
For Robert Cox the critical tradition represents a certain sensibility, a historical
awareness of the limitations and content of theory itself – an awareness that is
presumably lacking in IR ‘orthodoxy’. In a celebrated reference to the Frankfurt
School (a School that is often described as ‘critical theory’) he says: ‘[t]heory is
always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective’.1 In a
similar vein, ‘post-structuralists’ like Richard Ashley, employ techniques drawn from
philosophy and literary criticisms such as deconstruction to comb through IR texts
in order to ‘reveal’, as they put it, the historical specificity and power assumptions
embedded in conventional IR theory.2 The not-too-charitable implications are, of
* I would like to thank Anastasia Nesvetailova, Nick Rengger, Ben Thirkell-White and the
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
1 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’,
Millennium: Journal of International Relations, 10:2 (1981), reprinted in Robert W. Cox with
Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
p. 87. On theories as instrumental knowledge, see Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest
(London: Heinemann, 1978).
2 Whether the IR variant of post-structuralism may be considered post-structuralist in the first place
is a matter of dispute. See Colin Hoadley, ‘An Archaeology of Post-Structural Intent in
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course, that ‘mainstream’ or ‘orthodox’ scholars are either willing servants of power
(for what reason? power? money? prestige? In other words, for all the motives that
realists tend to associate with some universal human nature! Sic!); or alternatively,
are unaware, naı¨ve conformists who fail to question the ‘party line’.
Human failings, lack of curiosity or intellectual mediocrity are not to be dis-
counted, but they are not the exclusive domain of orthodoxy. It is not entirely clear
why, for instance, ‘orthodox’ IR scholars, educated as historians, such as Martin
Wight, E. H. Carr, or, for that matter, Robert Keohane, ‘an outstanding scholar of
remarkably broad erudition’ as Benjamin Cohen describes him,3 should lack basic
historical sensibility that seems to come so easily and naturally to those who choose
to describe themselves as critical scholars. It is equally not clear why mainstream
scholars, and only mainstream scholars, are so blind to their human failings. This is
not to say that there are no important diﬀerences in approaches. Benjamin Cohen
believes that there is a distinct ‘British’ School4 which can be described as critical:
‘Least of all did British academics require’, he writes, ‘any encouragement to
question authority. So-called ‘‘critical’’ theory, challenging orthodoxies of all kinds,
has long found a comfortable home in the country’s universities.’ A respectful and
sympathetic observer of the British School, he nonetheless warns, ‘The British school
may be fairly criticized for its less rigorous approach to theory building and testing,
which makes generalization diﬃcult and cumulation of knowledge virtually imposs-
ible’.5 I suspect that many IR scholars would readily sign up to this statement.
These conversations and debates are important and must continue. Nonetheless,
I argue, they fundamentally miss the main cause for the bifurcation of the IR
discipline between orthodoxies and the critical traditions. As Richard Marsden notes,
a ‘theory is a cluster of conclusions in search of premises’.6 People tend not to chose
to be mainstream or critical by patiently sifting through the evidence, examining
the quality of research methodologies, historical evidence, and so on – these sorts of
criticisms, justified or not, are retrospective. To understand the cause of the
bifurcation of the IR discipline we need to enquire into the diverging clusters of
conclusions that are currently in search of a premise. This seems to be the core of the
debate.
Nor can we truly judge a school, an approach or a theory purely on the basis of
material already published. Theories are changing, schools of thoughts are evolving,
and traditions often develop in unpredictable ways. Writing in a diﬀerent context, but
in words that are wholly applicable to IR, Colander, Holt and Rosser argue:
‘Standard classifications tend to miss the diversity that exists within the profession,
International Relations’ (Thesis, University of Sussex, 2003); Earl Gammon and Ronen Palan,
‘Libidinal Economies and International Political Economy’, in Marieke De Goede (ed.),
International Political Economy and Poststructural Politics (London: Palgrave, 2006). Ashley,
however, is arguably one of the few to have applied rigorously the deconstruction method to IR
texts. See Richard Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, in Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and
Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
3 Benjamin J. Cohen, Building Bridges: The Construction of International Political Economy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
4 Cohen writes specifically about IPE, but his comments may be applied to IR more broadly.
5 Ibid.
6 He continues, theory ‘is not pieced together from observed phenomena; it is rather what makes it
possible to observe phenomena as being of certain sort, and as related to other phenomena.
Theories put phenomena into systems. They are built up ‘‘in reverse’’ – retroductively.’ Richard
Marsden, The Nature of Capital: Marx After Foucault (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 45.
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and the many new ideas that are being tried out. They miss the important insight that
one can be part of the mainstream and yet not necessarily hold ‘‘orthodox’’ ideas.’
The reality, they continue, ‘is that at any point in time a successful discipline will have
hundreds of new ideas being tried out, as new methods, new technology and new
information become available. That is what happens at the edge of economics.’7
It is, therefore, the edge of the IR discipline that should interest us, not its centre.
And what is happening at the edge? One important development, I argue, is that
the core meaning of the term ‘inter-national relations’, the very boundaries of the
discipline, is emerging as a key area of debate. From the early 1970s onwards the
discipline had witnessed an inexorable, if wholly understandable, growth in
the number of issues, processes and themes under consideration. No longer seen as
merely the study of peace and war, the IR discipline has sought to position itself at
the heart of great many debates in the social sciences. This trend has been evident in
the development of sub-disciplines such as International Political Economy (IPE),
normative theory, gender theory and so on. More so, if IR was dominated by the
various schools of ‘realism’ up to say, the early 1990s, a decade or so later the
discipline contains a bewildering array of theories and approaches, ranging from –
and the list below is by no means not complete – romantic realism, anti-reformation
realism, Christian realism, structural realism, neorealism, rational choice realism,
legalistic idealism, liberalism, methodological individualism, the interdependence
school, structural functionalism, regime theorists, two-level game theory, institution-
alists of all variants, post-structuralism, critical theorists, hermeneutics, constructiv-
ism (including Weberian constructivism, Wittgenstenian constructivism, symbolic
interactionists and few others); Marxism of all sorts and descriptions: Marxists of
the world system variants, dependency theorists, Gramscian and neo-Gramscian,
derivation school, structural Marxists, Leninists, critical realists, regulationists,
Troskyists; gender theorists, feminist theories, queer theorists and speed theorists;
Braudelians, Polanyians, Nietschians, Deleuzians, Foucauldians, Zizekians . . .
Followers of Levinas, Rawls and Schmidt . . . and so on and so forth.
The plethora of schools of thoughts, and the alarming rate of expansion in the
number of theoretical approaches and methodological and epistemological debates,
is characteristic of a discipline in a turmoil, in search of an identity. It is worth asking
ourselves why IR scholars display such cravings for change? What is the underlying
problem, the unresolved issue (or issues) that drive students of IR with such tenacity
to seek alternatives? One popular explanation for the proliferation of theories and
approaches in IR can be discounted from the outset. There is little doubt that, as in
every other field of the social sciences and the humanities, fashions and fads play
a role. Indeed, in the 1960s, every field of the social sciences was touched by
structuralism, behaviourism and system theories. By now, even ‘hard’ disciplines
such as law or accounting boast their own variants of post-structuralism, discourse
theories, gender theories, constructivisms and game theories, and IR certainly does
not wish to fall behind.8 Nonetheless, it is a mistake to attribute the contemporary
proliferation of theories to fads and fashions only. The dissatisfaction in and with IR
goes, I believe, deeper, much deeper.
7 David Colander, Richard P. F. Holt and J. Barkley Rosser, ‘The Changing Face of Mainstream
Economics’, Review of Political Economy, 16:4 (2004), pp. 485–99, at 487.
8 And what about ‘critical pet studies’? Surely, an IR variant will make its appearance at some point.
See Heidi J. Nast, ‘Critical Pet Studies?’, Antipode, 38:5 (2006), pp. 894–906.
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At issue is the manner and the way by which the expansion of the International
Relations discipline can take place. The principle contribution of the critical IR
theory has been to radically resituate the discipline in relation to the other social
sciences. It has done this partly by exposing the weaknesses of mainstream
approaches, pointing, for instance, to the plain implausibility of the idea of a timeless
unitary state. Even realists had to acknowledge, however reluctantly (as the definition
by negation clearly demonstrates), the relevance of ‘non-state actors’, to some degree.
The mainstream attempt to expand IR by ‘bolting on’ ideas like ‘interdependence’ or
‘domestic actors’ onto a realist framework was never really going to work. The
critical tradition understood that a far more thorough rethinking of the discipline is
necessary. It has abandoned, for all intents and purposes, the eﬀorts to constitute IR
as a separate, bounded sphere of activity, and sought to locate IR as a component of
pan-disciplinary studies of global order and change. The critical tradition also
understood early on that IR is unlikely to serve as (what I call) ‘first order discipline’
within the social sciences, but will remain a derivative discipline, drawing more
explicitly on other, more fundamental, theoretical claims. What it does do, though,
is address a particular aspect of the human condition, which is omitted by the other
social sciences.
While the critical tradition in IR has been oﬀ the mark earlier on these matters, the
mainstream too is rapidly developing credible pan-disciplinary approaches to the
study of processes of order and change. At this point of the game the principle
theories of IR have already reconstituted themselves as components of what I call
general theories of order and change. As a result the key diﬀerence between
orthodoxy and heterodoxy lies elsewhere – a development that is always articulated
with suﬃcient precision in recent debates. The crucial diﬀerent lies between, on the
one hand, the rationalism as Helen Milner describes it, of mainstream founded on
methodological individualism and a behavioural theory of the subject,9 and the
non-rationalist perspectives which draw at core on the Freudian conception of the
subject.10 For the one, the subject is a rational advantage-seeking individual
operating nonetheless under the principles of bounded rationality. For the other,
rationality itself is suspect (or considered historically constituted) as the subject
appears to desire their own repression. The one is imbued with liberal optimism
about human progress, happiness and the control of nature, and the other takes a
more pessimistic view of humanity’s capacity to achieve emancipation and progress.
The article discusses these developments in the field of IR. I begin by arguing that
the meaning of ‘inter-national relations’, the very boundaries of the discipline, is
emerging as the focus of a debate in the field. This follows with a discussion of the
diﬀerences between methodological individualism and heterodoxy. I will then outline
some of the key methodological and analytical issues pertaining to the conceptualis-
ation of IR as a component of a general theory of order and change. Drawing on the
ideas of Goran Therborn, I argue that what a critical theory needs to do is pursue an
9 On rationalism, see Helen Milner, ‘Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis Among
International, American, and Comparative Politics’, International Organization, 52:4 (1998),
pp. 759–86; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner, ‘International
Organization and the Study of World Politics’, International Organization, 52:4 (1998), pp. 645–85;
Amanda Dickins, ‘The Evolution of International Political Economy’, International Aﬀairs, 82:3
(2006), pp. 479–92.
10 See Gammon and Palan, ‘Libidinal Economics’.
50 Ronen Palan
approach that is: (a) globally encompassing, (b) historically oriented and (c) focused
on political institutions. I conclude this article by sketching out a distinct heterodox
approach to IR, found in work of Hegel, Marx and the French School of Regulation,
that has been largely ignored so far.
I acknowledge from the outset that as an analysis of a very diverse literature, and
as an eﬀort to make sense of what I take to be the implicit, sometimes hidden, issues
in contemporary debates, a certain degree of subjectivity is inevitable. Furthermore,
due to the enormity of the subject-matter, an article of this size can at best only begin
to sketch possibilities for new research.
No longer merely the science of peace and war
Not too long ago, IR was conceived as ‘the science of peace and war’.11 The reason
being, E. H. Carr famously explained, was that ‘[w]ar lurks in the background of
international politics’.12 As a science of peace and war, IR was considered a
‘policy-oriented’ discipline whose task was to advise governments on policy in what
is taken to be a perilous and treacherous sphere of international aﬀairs.13 To achieve
these goals, the ‘old’ IR sought to develop a theory of the determinant of
policymaking in what was regarded as an anarchical system of states.14 The discipline
of International Relations centred, unsurprisingly, on the dynamics of the relation-
ships of conflict and cooperation among states, or as it was sometimes described, the
politics of international relations.15
By the 1970s, however, many scholars had begun to question the narrow remits of
IR.16 Susan Strange lent her voice to the growing dissatisfaction when she wrote:
‘Contemporary literature with certain rare exceptions has been predominantly
directed at far too narrow set of questions’.17 For Helen Milner, the problem with the
old IR lies in the neglect of the interaction between domestic and international
factors. Milner finds Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory particularly useful.18
For Robert Cox, in contrast, the problem lies with the ‘distinction between state and
11 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (London: Weidenfield and
Nicolson, 1966), p. 6.
12 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of
International Relations (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 109.
13 Michael Nicholson, ‘What is the Use of International Relations’, Review of International Studies, 26
(2000), pp. 183–98; William Wallace, ‘Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and
Practice in International Relations’, Review of International Studies, 22:3 (1996), pp. 301–22.
14 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order In World Politics (London: Macmillan,
1977).
15 Northedge, for instance, defines international politics ‘as those mutual dealings of governments
representing sovereign states’. Fred S. Northedge, The International Political System (London:
Faber, 1976).
16 Robert O. Keohane and John S. Nye (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).
17 Susan Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction To International Political Economy (New York:
Basil, 1988), p. 12.
18 ‘Although many scholars have recognized the interdependence of domestic and international
politics, few have developed explicit theories of this interaction’. Helen V. Milner, Interests,
Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1997), p. 4.
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civil society’.19 Cox finds inspiration principally in the work of Gramsci. Hendrik
Spruyt demonstrates that the question of origins of the units that make up the
international system has become a hot topic in IR. He finds inspiration in Douglas
North’s variant of evolutionary institutionalism.20 Nicolas Onuf goes further. He
believes that ‘The way to proceed should now be clear. It is to look for a substantial
ensemble of practices, the coherence of which is not reflected in, much less produced
by, the constitutive claims of established social sciences disciplines.’21 Looking
beyond ‘established’ social sciences, Onuf believes that Wolin’s notion of ‘political
society’ is the answer.
The expansion of the number of topics and issues under investigation represents a
critical phase in the maturing of the IR discipline. It poses, however, two sets of
interrelated dilemmas. The first dilemma concerns the relationship between an
expanded version of the discipline and existing theories. Is it possible to bolt-on new
theories and approaches onto existing theories? Or does an expanded IR imply a
reordering of theory itself? The second, and related dilemma, is whether the
expansion of the field into new areas and topics may compromise the coherence of
the field, perhaps to the point of destroying the possibilities for a credible theory in
the first place. There is a danger, in other words, that IR would become a place where
everything goes – which is the impression sometimes given by some of the more
outlandish new theories.
Let us discuss briefly the first concern. Bolt-on theories are normally advanced in
recognition that at least some of the existing theories oﬀer something valuable.
Knowledge is supposed to be cumulative and we should resist, as far as possible, the
temptation to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Such a bolt-on approach to
theory is represented, for instance, by Keohane and Nye’s interdependence theory.
Interdependence, they say, ‘aﬀects world politics and the behaviour of states’ but
‘governmental actions also influence patterns of interdependence’.22 Indeed, they
acknowledge in another influential book, that ‘a good deal of intersocietal inter-
course, with significant political importance, takes place without government con-
trol’.23 Although they assure their readers: ‘there would be no point in ignoring the
nation-state.’24
What becomes clear is that for Keohane and Nye interdependence does not
challenge the fundamentals of world politics as described by realists. They merely
seek to bolt on a new concern upon an existing theoretical framework. But what if
interdependence is not a late arrival ‘aﬀecting’ world politics at later stages of
capitalism, but a constant feature of world politics? How should we understand
world politics in the age of intensified interdependence, or, as it is now called,
globalisation? The interdependence school is unable to provide satisfactory answers
to these questions because it placed itself under this epistemological straightjacket.
19 Cox, Approaches to World Order’, p. 86.
20 Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
21 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International
Relations (University of South California Press, 1989).
22 Keohane and Nye, Transnational Relations, p. 5.
23 R. O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics In Transition (Boston,
MA: Little, Brown, 1977), p. x.
24 Ibid., p. xxiv.
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The problem with bolt-on theories, in other words, is that they tend to be
historically specific and date very quickly. They encourage the use of theory as a
‘toolbox, out of which one can take individual concepts and theorems depending on
one’s immediate goals, without having to worry about the rest of the theory’.25
Indeed, quite often bolt-on theories undermine the very theory to which they have
been bolted on. Milner, for instance, proposes to ‘relax’ the unitary state thesis – in
reality, she abandons the theory altogether.26 Milner’s treatment of the older theories
is not an exception, it is the norm.
Susan Strange represents the opposite trend when she calls for wholesale
reordering of theory itself. For her the problem with contemporary IR is not with this
or that theory, but with the very orientation of the field towards too narrow
questions. International Relations (or IPE, as she calls it),27 she avers, is not simply
a theory of interstate conflict, as many seem to believe, but ‘a framework of analysis,
a method of diagnosis of the human condition as it is, or as it was, aﬀected by
economic, political and social circumstances’.28 I believe that Strange captures with
these words an important undercurrent in contemporary IR scholarship, speaking for
the fledgling heterodoxy in IR.
One of the common, justifiable criticisms of Strange was that she intuited, but
never spelled out clearly the full implications of her approach. Her words capture,
however, in a condensed form some of the fundamentals of the emerging tradition.
They consist of three ideas:
1. IR is a framework of analysis or a method of diagnosis;
2. IR is concerned, first and foremost, with the ‘human condition’;
3. In reorienting IR towards the study of the ‘human condition’, Strange reopens the
question of the specificity of IR, in other words, she raises the thorny question of
the relationship between IR and other academic disciplines which, after all, are
equally concerned with the question of the ‘human condition’.
Let us dwell briefly on Strange’s proposals. Strange’s first point, that IR is a
framework of analysis or a method of diagnosis, is arguably the least controversial.
Robert Cox, for instance, has something similar in mind when he writes that ‘the
primary task of theory is . . . to enable the mind to come to grips with the reality
it confronts’.29 Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner advance similar ideas, albeit
employing a somewhat diﬀerent jargon when they point out the diﬀerences between
what they call general theoretical orientations and specific research programmes.30
Their notion of a ‘general theoretical orientation’ is equivalent to Strange’s idea of a
framework. They suggest that a fundamental reorientation of the field must take
place, first and foremost, at the very general level of theoretical orientation.
25 Schimank as quoted in Alex Viskovatoﬀ, Foundations of Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Social
Systems, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 29:4 (1999), p. 81.
26 Milner, Rationalizing Politics.
27 Strange expresses disenchantment with IR and hence she speaks of IPE. Susan Strange,
‘International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect’, International
Aﬀairs, 46:2 (1970), pp. 304–15.
28 Strange, States and Markets, p. 16.
29 Cox, Approaches to World Order, p. 87.
30 ‘General theoretical orientations provide heuristic – they suggest relevant variables and causal
patterns that provide guidelines for developing specific research programmes . . . and specific
research programmes links explanatory variables to a set of outcomes, or dependent variables’.
Katzenstein, Keohan and Krasner, ‘International Organization’, p. 646.
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Constitutive and derivative theories in the social sciences
What does ‘general theoretical orientation’ means? How do we apply these ideas
specifically to IR? Somewhat schematically, we may distinguish two types of social
sciences disciplines: ﬁrst order disciplines may be described as constitutive disciplines;
second order disciplines may be described as derivative disciplines. First order
disciplines are concerned, among other things, with the essential theories of human
behaviour, rationality and causation. Second order disciplines derive their ideas
about human behaviour, rationality and causation from one or another first order
discipline applying them to a specific time-space or thematic context. By describing
some disciplines as derivative, I do not wish to denigrate or diminish the merits of
these disciplines. I am simply pointing out that certain disciplines and subject-matters
are not directly concerned with the fundamentals of human behaviour, but draw their
constitutive concepts from order disciplines.
I am not sure whether my list of first order disciplines is complete, but I would say
that moral philosophy, political economy, linguistics and sociology have emerged
as first order disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. Political economy,
for instance, seeks to provide a constitutive theory of capital as a totalising force
of society. Linguistics emerged in the twentieth century as another constitutive
discipline, when the work of De Saussure, among others, inspired the development
in literature, structural anthropology, psychoanalysis and so on.31 Such first order
disciplines do not provide for comprehensive theories of order and change. That is
why first and second order disciplines always relate to second order disciplines within
pan-disciplinary general theoretical frameworks, each of which, I propose, oﬀers what
Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner call ‘general theoretical orientation’.
General theories may be defined as synthetic eﬀorts aimed at providing a credible
link between theories of the subject (or individuality), the collective (state, society,
nation) and the international (world-economy, civilisation, the transnational arena).32
While unsurprisingly, IR theories are centred on the third dimension, it can be easily
demonstrated that every reasonably developed IR theory draws upon, and in turn,
contributes to, a general pan-disciplinary heuristics, which consists of theories of the
three dimensions and the relation between them.33
Let us take the case of Hobbes as an illustration of a more general proposition.34
Students of International Relations may be somewhat surprised to learn that
Hobbes’ great work, The Leviathan, begins not with a theory of the state (the
commonwealth) or international relations, but with theories of language, thought
31 Ferdinand De Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (London: Duckworth, 1983). Broadly
conceived, sociology, (including social anthropology), lays the foundations for individualist,
structural and systemic theories of society. Sociology, however, can serve as first order and second
order discipline concomitantly, as some sociological theories draw their basic insights of human
behaviour from other disciplines.
32 The notion of a general theory does not imply a universally accepted unitary, systematic and
comprehensive theory of order and change. Obviously, in contrast to the sciences, the social sciences
are unable to agree on one dominant general theory on par with say, the dominance of Newtonian
mechanics until the advent of relativity theory, and probably never will. Nevertheless, social sciences
theories are not isolated islands of thought, but belong, if often very roughly and unwittingly, to
pan-disciplinary general theories, or at the very least, an eﬀort to establish theories whose ultimate
aim is the establishment of a unitary theory of order and change.
33 For a similar point see Cox, Approaches to World Order, p. 91.
34 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951).
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and rationality. The Leviathan, literally a whale in Hebrew, represents the
commonwealth to Hobbes. The commonwealth is depicted therefore as the largest
mammal on earth, as for Hobbes the commonwealth was the equivalent of an
artificial organism, a work of art. The concept of art, which is epistemologically at the
origins of the notion of ‘artificiality’, was understood diﬀerently at the times of
Hobbes. In Hobbes’ words, ‘For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called
a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in Latin, CIVITAS), which is but an
artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose
protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial
soul’.35
Hobbes’ Leviathan is narrated in the form of deduction from first principles.
Hobbes begins his great work by outlining a theory of subjectivity, rationality and
desire. The first chapter is entitled ‘of sense’, the second, ‘the imagination’. From
general propositions about the nature of the senses, language and abstract thought,
Hobbes develops a theory of discourse, speech, writing, reason and knowledge. These
concepts are then employed as the building blocks of a theory of desire, including the
desire for power. ‘The power of a man, to take it universally, is his present means to
obtain some future apparent good, and is either original or instrumental’.36 From this
Hobbes arrives at his famous deduction (interestingly, he understood it as a
component of a theory of manners), ‘So that in the first place, I put for a general
inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that
ceaseth only in death.’37 The Hobbesian theory of the state and inter-state relation-
ship has been developed explicitly within the framework of a general theory of order
and change.38
In sum, all IR theories establish, whether explicitly or implicitly, a relationship
with a general theory in the social sciences and social philosophy. That does not
mean, unfortunately, that IR theories do so systematically. Nonetheless, all the
familiar concepts we employ in IR such as state, power, actors, rationality,
hegemony, interest, balance, equilibrium and so on, as well as the various metaphors
and analogies that inform and shape our thinking in IR, are drawn from one or
another general theory in the social sciences.
Towards a general theory of order and change
Considering the link between IR and general theoretical frameworks, Strange’s
second point, concerning nothing less than the human condition itself, provides an
important insight. For Strange strives to identify the underlying ‘problematique’ that
35 Ibid., Introduction, capitalised in the original.
36 Ibid., ch. x, ‘of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour and Worthiness’.
37 Ibid., ch. XI, ‘Of the Diﬀerence of Manners’.
38 Within the discipline of IR, Hans Morgenthau comes closest to Hobbes when he argues that ‘The
main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international
politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between
reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. This is reminiscent
of Hobbes’ theory of desire which translates into a theory of desire for power. Hans J. Morgenthau,
Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th edn. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1967), p. 5.
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links critical and heterodox theory to a general theory of the social. She believes she
had found it in the notion of human condition ‘as it is, or as it was, aﬀected by
economic, political and social circumstances’.39
Where does the concept of the human condition come from? The concept of the
human condition is reminiscent of Heidegger’s description of sociology as ‘a general
theory of man and his human relations’.40 Or Weber who identifies two disciplines,
history and sociology (or the cultural sciences).41 For Strange, it appears, IR is part
of a pan-disciplinary sociological tradition which seeks to investigate the nature of
order and change in society. It may be argued that one of the great forces for change
in the IR field is motivated by the conviction that the international arena adds a vital,
often missing, dimension to the study of the processes of order and change in society.
A conviction that implies, in turn, that International Relations as a discipline should
be integrated into the broader field of investigation of the nature of order and change
in the contemporary world.
This raises a third question. If IR is no longer merely the study of peace and war,
but should be oriented towards existential questions such as the human condition,
why have a field of study called International Relations in the first place? This is a
very good question. In fact, the concept of ‘inter-national relations’ oﬀers an
important clue to a bias in the discipline, alluding to one of the leading heuristics in
the field – classical realism. The term ‘inter-national’ is an historical overhang from
a period in the history of state formation, around the late eighteenth century, when
the nation began to be considered as an ‘actor’ in its own right in world politics.42
Inter-national relations, as it implies, is the study of the relationship between nations
or people in the world, constituted as it were, as personalities.43
Contemporary thinking, however, considers the nation in very diﬀerent light. The
nation is a constructed identity, a product of historical encounters. The nation,
therefore, cannot be considered the primary unit of ‘inter-national relations’, nor
indeed, is the state the primary unit – particularly as some begin to think about a
post-state scenarios which they call ‘globalisation’. If the nation is not the main
‘actor’ in world-politics, then the very meaning of inter-national relations becomes
problematic. The heterodox tradition, however, may not be satisfied to replace one
set of actors with another; it seeks to question the very idea of privileging an ‘actor’
in the first place. That is exactly what Strange is aiming for with her notion of the
‘human condition’.
39 Strange, States and Markets, p. 16.
40 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore J. Kisielime
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 15.
41 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 2 vols., edited by Guenther
Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1978), p. 19.
42 For discussion of the emergence of the nation as a force in world politics, see Ge´rard Mairet, Le
Principe de Souveraineté: Histoires et Fondements du Pouvoire Moderne (Paris: Gallimard, 1997).
43 A point that was already clear to Heinrich von Treitschke in the nineteenth century: ‘Treat the State
as a person’, says Trietschke in a typical classical realist fashion, ‘and the necessary and rational
multiplicity of States follows . . . Just as in individual life the ego implies the existence of the
non-ego, so it does in the State. The State is power, precisely in order to assert itself as against
other equally independent powers. War and the administration of justice are the chief tasks of even
the most barbaric States.’ Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics (London: Constable, 1916), p. 19. The
use of the concept of ‘ego’ in a pre-Freudian manner is exemplary of my point about a general
theory. Classical realism evolve out of a general theory of the subject and the collective to arrive at
a theory of international relations.
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Methodological individualism vs. heterodoxy
We encounter at this point an important dispute in the social sciences between two
sets of heuristics, methodological individualism (or rationalism) and heterodoxy.
They each yield radically diﬀerent conceptions of the international. Arguably, the
most important exponent of contemporary methodological individualism was Max
Weber.44 Weber was an important contributor to late nineteenth century philosophi-
cal debate on the relationship between the sciences and the social sciences.45 He took
from the sciences an important methodological point: scientific advance could be
achieved only on the basis of commonly observable phenomena. Some fashionable
theories of his time, which attributed cause or volition to unobservables such as God,
the nation or the working-classes, were therefore considered by Weber unscientific.
Weber argued that the only possible solid scientific basis for the cultural sciences
was meaningful individual action. In his words, ‘[a]ction in the sense of subjectively
understandable orientation of behaviour exists only as the behaviour of one or more
individual human beings.’46 Thus Weberian action-based methodology privileges the
notion of the ‘actor’. The commonly heard reference to states as ‘actors’ or, worse,
to ‘non-state actors’, is, therefore, essentially misguided. The notion of actor is
reserved by Weber (and other methodological individualists) to the individual. This
is why Helen Milner, for instance, prefers to describe states as ‘agency’, a more
appropriate terminology from a methodological individualistic perspective.47
There are, however, two significant points of dispute between methodological
individualism and the heterodox approach. While methodological individualists
presume the rationality of the subject (bounded rationality or not), and hence centre
on the concept of preferences and choice, heterodox approaches in the social sciences
are founded on a radically diﬀerent theory of the ego. Rather than assuming that
people chose what is best for them, and then puzzle over those cases that patently
contradict such assumptions. It was the genius of Deleuze and Guattari to have
noticed that the subject of methodological individualism ‘presupposes a fantastic
repression’ – largely self-repression of the subjects ostensibly by they themselves.48
The key question for heterodoxy, they argue, is ‘how could the masses be made to
desire their own repression?49 To be somewhat schematic, orthodoxy asks how people
44 Richard Miller defines methodological individualism as ‘the doctrine that social phenomena must be
explainable in terms of the psychologies and situations of the participants in those phenomena.’
Richard W. Miller, ‘Methodological Individualism and Social Explanation’, Philosophy of Science,
45:3 (1978), pp. 387–414, at 387. Kenneth Arrow credits Menger as the originator of methodological
individualism. Kenneth Arrow, ‘Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge’, American
Economic Review, 84:2 (1994), pp. 1–9, at 2. Others believe the methodology goes all the way back
to Hobbes. Joseph Agassi, ‘Methodological Individualism’, The British Journal of Sociology, 11:3
(1960), pp. 244–70. For recent criticism of methodological individualism, see Barry Hindess,
Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1970); Andrew Sayer,
Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach (London: Routledge, 1992).
45 For a good discussion, see Guy Oakes, Weber and Rickert: Concept Formation in the Cultural
Sciences (Cambridge, MA, MIT, 1988).
46 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 9. The behavioural ‘revolution’ took a step further and pronounced
the idea of meaningful or individual subjective meaning to his or her action redundant.
47 Milner, ‘Rationalizing Politics’, p. 4.
48 Gilles Deleuze and Fe´lix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: The
Athlone Press, 1984), p. 3.
49 Ibid., p. xiv. They continue ‘[t]his is a question which the English and Americans are reluctant to
deal with directly’, p. xiv.
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achieve what is good for them; heterodoxy asks why people desire what is bad for
them. This starting point leads orthodoxy to a radically diﬀerent conception of the
subject, history, social institutions, causality and indeed rationality. It brings us back
and clarifies further Strange’s point about the ‘human condition’ as the core
problematic of the social sciences.
One of the ironies of contemporary research is that while orthodoxy assumes a
rational subject, and ends up frequently with theories of systemic irrationality;
heterodoxy assumes the irrationality of the subject, but often ends up with theories
of systemic rationality. Heterodoxy seems to have been attracted to some totalising
reductionist theories of world order, in which the entire human experience is reduced
to one overwhelming structure aimed at maintaining exploitation, alienation and
poverty – in short, we are back to the ‘moral’ sciences. Growing interest in
evolutionary epistemology in the social sciences is aimed precisely at overcoming
such normative presumptions. In addition, we should note that heterodoxy does not
contradict the theory of the utility-maximising individual, it merely suggests that
such subjectivity is historically constituted. There are, not surprisingly, many
‘border-crossers’ among these two general types of theorising.
My second point concerns the area where the two approaches diﬀer significantly.
It is in the way they understand the relationship between diﬀerent fields of enquiry.
Methodological individualists posit diﬀerent spheres of meaningful action. (Hence,
presumably, the approach is considered ‘positivist’ and even ‘empiricist’ by IR
scholars – although it is often recognised that rationalist methodologies tend to be
deductive and hence, strictly speaking, non-empiricist.)50 From such a perspective the
IR discipline is defined as a distinct sphere of activities, interstate relationships.
However as John Wilkinson points out, methodologically individualistic approaches
have ‘no use for interdisciplinary collaboration, since by definition no one actor can
influence the behaviour of another and preferences and technology represent an
exogenous ‘state of the world’.51 Orthodoxy assumes that similar dynamics prevail in
diﬀerent spheres of action, so that in principle, we can employ neoclassical concepts
such as utility, collective choice, transaction costs in sociology, political science and
so on.52 Wilkinson contrasts methodological individualism with heterodoxy in which
‘activity is socially constructed and maintained and historically determined by
individual and collective actions expressed through organisations and institutions.
50 I am using ‘tend’ and ‘often’ because it is increasingly diﬃcult to make categorical statements.
Kathleen Thelen writes about the diﬀerent schools of institutionalism ‘Each of these three schools in
fact represents a sprawling literature characterized by tremendous internal diversity, and it is often
also diﬃcult to draw hard and fast lines between them. The diﬀerences that have been identified
amount to tendencies that apply unevenly across particular authors within each school of thought.
The walls dividing the three perspectives have also been eroded by ‘border crossers’ who have
resisted the tendencies toward cordoning these schools oﬀ from each other and who borrow liberally
(and often fruitfully) where they can, in order to answer specific empirical questions.’ Kathleen
Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, 2
(1999), pp. 369–404, at 370. Thelen is correct: ‘Border crossers’ make it diﬃcult and unnecessary to
make such categorical statements.
51 John Wilkinson ‘A New Paradigm for Economic Analysis?’, Economy & Society, 26:3 (1997),
pp. 309.
52 Gerlad M. Meier, ‘Trade Policy, Development, and The New Political Economy’, in Ronald W.
Jones and Anne O. Krueger (eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade: Essays In Honor of
Robert E. Baldwin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
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The analysis . . . becomes a collective endeavour of economics, sociology, history,
organisation theory and political philosophy’.53
Heterodoxy and the constitution of the field of International Relations
If an analysis is a ‘collective endeavour,’ as Wilkinson suggests, what is the
distinctively international dimension of these pan-disciplinary eﬀorts? Goran
Therborn summarises succinctly heterodoxy under what he calls, ‘a three-
dimensional approach’. An holistic investigation, he says, is ‘globally encompassing
in a sense meaningful to actors in the world; historically oriented, with an eye both
for concrete processes and for broad, connecting, epochal interpretation; and . . .
having a clear focus on political institutions’.54 The three-dimensional approach is a
good summary of heterodox methodology. And it reads like a theoretician’s
nightmare, particularly to one who aspires for parsimony! For how can a credible
theory come out of this? Let us go over the three points, they are interrelated:
1. Globally encompassing research agenda
The notion of a ‘globally encompassing’ research agenda implies a number of things.
First, heterodoxy encourages a geographically expansive perspective, and takes, in
eﬀect, the entire planet as its subject matter. For Waltz, for instance, small states are
nearly ‘washed up’ as economic entities and ‘pose no problem for international-
political theory’, I have argued, in contrast, that some of the smallest and least
powerful countries in the world, the tax havens, played a crucial role in globalisation
and forced changes upon larger states.55 Equally, Cox considers one of the
advantages of Marxism to ‘add a vertical dimension of power to the horizontal that
dimension of rivalry’.56 While readily acknowledging asymmetries in power and
capabilities, heterodoxy sees no particular reason for privileging certain states or
regions in the world a priori.
Second, in principle, heterodoxy is sympathetic to comparative research. Yet,
comparative research is of value up to a point because many mechanisms and
processes do not necessarily correspond to the political boundaries of the nation-
state. By its very nature, comparative research is incapable of appreciating such
mechanisms and processes, and may either exclude them from the outset or
misinterpret them. Third, the notion of a globally encompassing research implies an
expansion of the number of issues under investigation. The discipline of International
Relations should concern itself, according to this view, not only with interstate
53 Wilkinson, ‘A New Paradigm’, p. 310.
54 Goran Therborn, ‘The Right to Vote and the Four World Routes through Modernity’, in Rolf
Torstendahl (ed.), State Theory and State History (London: Sage, 1992), p. 63.
55 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 94;
Ronen Palan, The Oﬀshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and Nomad Millionaires
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
56 Cox, Approaches to World Order, p. 95.
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relationships and not only with the dynamics and forces of capital, but with the entire
range of trans-border communications and exchanges.
2. Historically oriented approach
‘Critical theory’, writes Robert Cox, ‘is theory of history in the sense of being
concerned not just with the past but with a continuing process of historic change’.57
Critical theory takes, in other words, an historical perspective on the present.
Roughly speaking, there are three models of historical change: universalistic, cyclical
and evolutionary theories. Universalistic theories, associated with orthodoxy, are
described by Charles Tilly as ‘covering laws’: ‘In covering law accounts, explanation
consists of subjecting robust empirical generalizations to higher- and higher-level
generalizations, the most general of all standing as laws. In such accounts, models are
invariant – they work the same under all conditions’.58 Krasner represents such an
approach when he says: ‘The fundamental problems of international politics and
international political economy are enduring, so are the theoretical perspectives that
we use to understand them’.59 Krasner appears to suggest that certain theories are
equally applicable to vastly diﬀerent historical epochs and geographical contexts.
Such universalistic or non-historical theories tend to treat the past as if it consisted
of a set of isolatable events that may be used to support some general propositions.
Cyclical theories assume recurrence of certain large-scale structural historical
patterns. Despite professing to do the opposite,60 cyclical theories are often non-
historical in orientation in the sense that they tend to adopt systemic explanations
which ‘consist of specifying a place for some event, structure, or process within a
larger self-maintaining set of interdependent elements and showing how the event,
structure, or process in question serves and/or results from interactions among
the larger set of elements’.61 Wallerstein’s theory of hegemonic cycle is a typical
cyclical theory of history.62 Certain variants of dependency theory also adopt a
cyclical approach: they take the historical patterns of international division of
labour that was typical of the period between 1930 and 1970 as a general theory of
capitalism.63 Cyclical theories are often functionalist, but are not necessarily so.64
57 Cox, ‘Social Forces’, p. 130.
58 Charles Tilly, ‘Mechanisms in Political Processes’, Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001),
pp. 421–41, at 423. See also Wilkinson, ‘A New Paradigm?’
59 Stephen Krasner, ‘International Political Economy: Abiding Discord’, Review of International
Political Economy, 1:1 (1994), p. 3.
60 ‘Capitalism is first and foremost a historical social system’, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern
World-System, vol. I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the
Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974), p. 13.
61 Tilly, ‘Mechanisms’, p. 23.
62 Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist
World-Economy’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 24 (1983), p. 100–8.
63 Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987).
64 ‘It is probably in theories of international relations that the tendency to lapse into functionalism or
even finalism . . . is most obvious, and that it inflicts most damage . . . Ricardo and the supporters
of the Heckschner–Ohlin–Samuelson theorem seem, for instance, to believe that the international
division of labour is the result of some world conference at which brilliant economists explained to
an admiring gallery of politicians’. Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles, p. 16. See also Tilly,
‘Mechanisms’.
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Many neo-Gramscians may find it somewhat disconcerting to discover that Robert
Cox’s theory of hegemony adopts almost word by word what Tilly says about
systemic explanation:
For the purpose of the present discussion, the method of historical structures is applied to
the three levels, or spheres of activity: (1) organization of production, more particularly
with regard to the social forces engendered by the production process; (2) forms of states as
derived from the study of state/society complexes; and (3) world orders, that is, the
particular configurations of forces with successively defined the problematic of war on
peace for the ensemble of states. Each of these levels can be studied as a succession of
dominant and emergent rival structures.65
Notwithstanding the careful language and caveats employed by Cox (‘for the
purpose of the present discussion . . .’ and so on),66 not only does the Coxian
analytical scheme assert a relationship between the three categories, but also
emphasises that the relationship between the three categories is the key to the
understanding of human history. In other words, there are large-scale structural
historical patterns which ultimately repeat themselves.67 The method by which Cox
reaches this conclusion, whether through deductive or inductive reasoning, is not
entirely clear.68
In contrast to systemic and covering laws theories, evolutionary theories adopt the
Darwinian principle of cumulative causation. In its pure form, ‘Darwinian evolution
has no foreordained goal, but a continuity of cause and eﬀect without any trend, any
final term, or consummation. It is ‘blindly cumulative causation’.69 Charles Tilly calls
such an approach a mechanism – and process-based explanation: ‘process-based
explanations aim at modest ends – selective explanation of salient features by means
of partial causal analogies’.70 So that, for example, the study of the transition from
feudalism to capitalism is important and informative, but generalisations are diﬃcult
because transitions are unlikely to repeat themselves.
From an evolutionary perspective concepts such as states, nation, power, are
treated as historically specific – a point of agreement between evolutionary thinkers
and Gramsicans. However, if for Marxists capitalism is an historical system that
undergoes changes and evolution, then for evolutionary economists such as Veblen
and Commons, not only capitalism evolves, but capital itself undergoes evolution – a
point that Marxists do not take into account.71 Such deep evolutionary method tends
to assume that IR is not only what happens when nation-states have been
constituted, but is a field of study that encompasses within itself the evolution and
65 Cox, Approaches to World Order, p. 100, italics in the original.
66 Indeed, Cox distinguishes between his and the structural Marxist explanation which he regards as
ahistorical, ibid., p. 92. It can be argued, however, that Poulantzas’ work is far more historicist than
Cox has given credit to.
67 Hence, for instance, Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is considered of use to IR. See Cox, p. 100: ‘The
very notion that Gramsci developed a general theory of hegemony – a very doubtful proposition – is
a product of such a structural theory of history’.
68 This approach is very diﬀerent to Braudel, who is often confused for a world-system theorist.
Braudel adopts an evolutionary approach and says very clearly that he does not believe in the
universality of any analytical scheme: ‘I do not for instance believe in the permanent and
unchallenged superiority of political history and the sacrosanct primacy of the state’, he writes,
‘sometimes the state is well-nigh all-important, at other times it has little or no influence’. Fernand
Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th Centuries (New York: Harper, 1979), p. 460.
69 John Commons, Institutional Economics (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), p. 128.
70 Tilly, ‘Mechanisms’, p. 24.
71 Commons, Institutional Economics.
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change in every aspect of life. States, nations, societies, the ‘international system’ are
historically constituted within the very context that IR theory should help explain.
Whereas for Cox the evolution of ‘state form’ is explained primarily in terms of
production and world order, for the evolutionary approaches, there could be a much
greater variety of explanations.
3. Political institutions
Although it remains one of the most cited articles in IR, a key point in Ruggie’s
critique of hegemonic stability theory has been somewhat overlooked. ‘Eﬀorts to
construct international economic regimes in the interwar period’ he writes ‘failed not
because of the lack of a hegemon. They failed because, even had there been a
hegemon, they stood in contradiction to the transformation in the mediating role of
the state between market and society, which altered fundamentally the social purpose
of domestic and international authority’.72 Ruggie alludes here to a third approach,
more prevalent in sociology and political science, which regards the state as a key
societal institution mediating between diﬀerent social spheres. The diﬃculties of the
1930s, he believes, were not due to the failure of hegemony, but rather to the lack of
an adequate state form to mediate between market and society. For Ruggie, the state,
and other political institutions, serve primarily as mediating institutions between the
international arena and domestic politics.
Let us take another example to clarify this notion of mediation. The Marshall
plan, typically a key piece of evidence for the hegemony thesis, is significant, argues
Michael Hogan, on two counts. There are those – let us call them conventional
IR – who view the European recovery programme together with the NATO alliance
and other ‘instruments’ of the Cold War as ‘evidence of America’s assumption of
world leadership after the Second World War’.73 However more recent works, he
notes, ‘have portrayed twentieth-century developments as part of a larger historical
process by which Americans adjusted their economic and political institutions to the
profound transformations brought on by industrialization’.74
This is a crucial point that Hogan himself fails to pursue to the full. For he points
out two diametrically opposed paradigms of the relationships between IR theories
and the broader theories of order and change. The former, associated with the
so-called ‘realist’ approaches (but which could also be subsumed under certain
radical approaches), assumes from the outset that leadership and power is a value in
itself, and hence, it concludes, once the US found itself in a position of power, it
assumed the role of leadership in the world. According to the second position, the
‘US’ consists of a medley of organisations and institutions, with more or less a degree
of coherency between them. The state is less of a volitional ‘actor’ or a mere arena
mediating conflicting interests, it is more of a product of its own institutional
arrangement which structures its ways of behaving in the world.
72 John G. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the
Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, 36 (1982), pp. 397–415, at 397. Emphasis
mine.
73 Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 1.
74 Ibid., p. 2.
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Another example of state mediation theory is found in David Lake’s work. Lake
argues that contemporary eﬀorts at establishing institutions of global governance are:
Reflected in the persistence of the early industrializing model in the United States . . . [and
are] premised upon a large private sector that reflected the early American economy, the
constitution left large residual rights of control to individuals and the states.75
For Lake, contemporary American policy is not the product of some ‘national
interest’, nor can it be reduced to the interplay of competing social forces; the
American polity is an inherited complex institutional structure which tends to be to
some extent a prisoner of its own evolution.
The two positions may appear the same. They are not. According to the first,
states are volitional ‘rational actors’ that seek to shape their environment to serve
their national or vested interests. To the latter, state mediation theory, ‘hegemony’ is
viewed more as a gravitational field, a product of inherited institutional and social
forces that shape not only states behaviour in the world, but also their ‘structural
power’, as Susan Strange calls it.76 The crucial point is that these gravitational forces
evolve in processes that are not independent of the state system. States do not
undergo transformations independently of the international system, as realist IR has
it. Nor are the internal processes of state formation mere reflections of exogenous
forces, as world system theorists, for instance, appear to believe. Consequently, what
is interpreted as hegemony, leadership, struggle for world hegemony and so on, often
considered as an expression and manifestation of the tactics and strategies of
states – may have been brought about by ‘domestic’ realignment of forces, as they
seek to cope with circumstances and dynamics that may be beyond their control.77
Indeed, often under closer scrutiny such ‘domestic’ forces turn out to be of
international origins and vice versa.
But what then, is a better way of conceptualising the complex interaction between
the internal and the international? Although this question appears to have arisen in
IR only very recently, paradoxically one possible answer can be found in some of the
most familiar texts in the social sciences. Only that apparently, we never really paid
attention. The rest of this article aims to illustrate how the basis of an alternative,
evolutionary approach to world order can be found, among others, in the works of
Hegel, Marx and the French School of Regulation.
Hegel’s diﬀusionist theory of world spirit
It may come as a surprise to find that Georg Hegel intuited some of the basic
parameters of what is described here as an evolutionary-institutional theory of
international orders. Hegel’s ambition was to develop a holistic theory of world
society, a theory that brings together a theory of subjectivity and rationality with a
theory of world history. For Hegel, reason is not an abstract ahistorical set of rules
75 David Lake, ‘Global Governance: A Relational Contracting Approach’, Aseem Prakash and Jeﬀery
A. Hart (eds.), Globalization and Governance (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 345.
76 Strange, States and Markets.
77 See R. Palan and J. Abbott, State Strategies In The Global Political Economy (London: Pinter,
1996).
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and norms, ‘revealed’ to humanity through the grace of God. Reason is evolutionary;
it emerges through interaction, and history is the judge of truth. His interest is in
what today we consider as IR follows on from his observation that reason matures
in world historical conditions, that is, within the context of the international arena.
For Hegel, the emergence of the nation was a critical moment in the evolution of
the human spirit. In words that hark back to the origins of the concept of
international relations,78 he writes, ‘The nations are the concepts which the spirit has
formed itself’.79 The rational, he believed, ‘assumes varying shapes; but in none of
them is it more obviously an end than in that whereby the spirit explicates and
manifests itself in the endlessly varying forms which we call nations’.80 But, he warns,
‘world history takes account only of nations that constituted themselves into
states’.81
In light of the momentous significance of the nation-state, Hegel had to consider
also the significance of the relationship between states. He notes that:
[i]t is as particular entities that states enter into relations with one another. Hence their
relations are on the largest scale a maelstrom of external contingency and the inner
particularity of passions, private interests and selfish ends, abilities and virtues, vices,
forces, and wrong.82
But, he argues, the maelstrom of external contingency and inner particularity can
generate from time to time, by sheer accident or otherwise, historical moments
whereby some states’ internal structure happens to correspond most perfectly to the
structural flow of history. Such states emerge at these junctures as the most powerful
and successful states in the world. In his words:
If we stop for a moment to consider the political implications – that a state will be well
constituted and internally powerful if the private interest of its citizens coincides with the
general end of the state, so that the one can be satisfied and realized through the other. . . .
But for the state to achieve this unity, numerous institutions must be set up and
appropriate mechanisms invented, and the understanding must go through prolonged
struggles before it discovers what is in fact appropriate . . . the moment at which the state
attains this unity marks the most flourishing period in its history, when its virtue, strength,
and prosperity are at their height.83
Hegel had the recent experience of revolutionary France in mind. In developing this
theory, Hegel expresses the ‘problematic’ of International Relations for nineteenth
century Prussian thinkers: rivalries, wars and competition among states brought the
modern world to Prussia. Rivalry and wars are, therefore, not all bad. On the
contrary, these are the unwitting processes of history by which states could
potentially achieve their coveted unity, the internal harmony of institutions, norms
and spirit. Furthermore, rivalry and competition ensured the diﬀusion of the most
recent evolution of the human spirit and rationality in the world – they were positive
forces of change in history.
78 See discussion above.
79 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 51.
80 Ibid., p. 28.
81 Ibid., p. 95.
82 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. and notes by T. M. Knox (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1952), para. 340, p. 215.
83 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, p. 73.
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Here we find hints of an alternative conception of the international, and indeed, an
alternative conception of the role of hegemony in the international orders, a theory
more closely aligned to Hogan’s institutionalist interpretation of the Marshall plan.
Hegel stresses a view of the state as an historical juncture, a product of contingent
confluence of internal and external forces, whereby when a harmony is achieved
between ends and means, such a state proves particularly influential. The state is
important in Hegel’s theory as an institutional framework through which ‘the
universal which emerges and becomes conscious within the state’ manifests itself.84
But the universal is revealed in the state through the agency of an interactionist order.
Marx, ‘primitive accumulation’ and succession of hegemonies
Marx famously ‘inverted’ Hegel’s argument to show that what Hegel called ‘reason’
and ‘spirit’ were nothing but the spirit of the capitalist world economy. Marx agreed,
however, with Hegel on specifics: the role played by international rivalries in the
development of capitalism. If for Hegel, the rational emerges and becomes conscious
within the state, Marx says capitalism emerges and becomes conscious – that is, a
reality, within the state. In his words:
The diﬀerent moments of primitive accumulation can be assigned in particular to Spain,
Portugal, Holland, France and England, in a more or less chronological order. These
diﬀerent moments are systematically combined together at the end of the 17th [century] in
England; the combination embraces the colonies, the national debt, the modern tax system,
and the system of protection.85
According to Marx, each of these ‘hegemonies’ – a word he did not use – introduced
institutional innovations which proved important to future capitalist accumulation.
For instance, ‘the system of public credit i.e. of national debts, the origins of which
are to be found in Genoa and Venice as early as the Middle Ages, took possession
of Europe as a whole during the period of manufacture’.86 Genoa and Venice
introduced, therefore, an innovation which was diﬀused throughout Europe. Once
the system of public credit was in place, it was developed further elsewhere: ‘the
colonial system, with its maritime trade and its commercial wars, served as a
forcing-house for the credit system. Thus it first took root in Holland. The national
debt – whether despotic, constitutional or republican – marked the capitalist era with
its stamp the public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers of primitive
accumulation.’87
‘Thus the villainies of the Venetian system . . . formed one of the secret
foundations of Holland’s wealth in capital? There is a similar relationship between
Holland and England? The same thing is going on today between England and the
United States’.88 Capitalism, as it appears in these pages, is not an abstract or
universal ‘mode of production’; capitalism is a specific institutional form that
develops within an interactionist order constituted by the state system. Marx has not
84 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, p. 97.
85 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. I (London: Penguin, NLB, 1970), p. 914.
86 Ibid., p. 919.
87 Ibid., p. 919.
88 Ibid., p. 920.
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made much of the competition between states as a method of diﬀusion of the
institutional gain. But he clearly adopts Hegel’s idea that the hegemonic state is a
product of a confluence of forces, some internal, some external. Hegemony, in turn,
diﬀuses its institutional innovation throughout the international system by compe-
tition or force. In doing so, hegemony is the product of certain historical circum-
stances, able to shape the future direction of the world capitalist economy. The world
economy as a whole evolves through a succession of hegemonies.
The French regulation theory and evolutionary international political economy
The French School of Regulation is arguably the direct follower of Hegel and Marx.
An evolutionary theory of international orders can be teased out in a close reading
of some of the texts of this school of thought, particularly once the acknowledged
over-structural tendencies of the theory are laid to rest. The French School of
Regulation was originally a Marxist approach that emerged in the 1970s partially in
order to explain the continuing robustness of the world capitalist economy. The crisis
of the 1930s, which according to Marxist theory was the major and potentially
cataclysmic crisis predicted by Marx, should have resulted in the collapse of the world
capitalist system. Instead, following the twenty years which witnessed a global-
spanning great depression, the rise of extreme right movements such as Nazism and
Fascism and a major world war, a new order has emerged based on the universali-
sation of the New Deal principles among the advanced capitalist countries. The
regulationist answer to the Marxist conundrum – after all capitalism was supposed to
collapse – pointed out the ability of the state to generate systematic, if ultimately
contradictory, countervailing conditions to the natural crisis-prone tendencies of
capitalism. The new order, known as a Fordist mode of accumulation, which is very
similar to Ruggie’s idea of ‘embedded liberalism’, did not only resolve the crisis
tendencies, but also contributed to an unprecedented rate of economic growth among
the advanced industrialised countries. The question, then, is how and why capitalism
is able to regenerate itself and how and why such propitious regimes of accumulation
arise.
In answering these questions, Alain Lipietz, who is keenly aware of the structural
and (hence functional) tendencies of regulation theory, goes out of his way to soften
the edges and dispel any lingering notions of structural inevitability. Regime of
accumulation, he says, emerges in an evolutionary process reminiscent of Hegel and
Marx’ theory.
The important point, however, is that the emergence of a new regime of accumulation is
not a pre-ordained part of capitalism’s destiny, even though it may correspond to certain
identiﬁable ‘tendencies’ . . . Regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation are chance
discoveries made in the course of human struggles . . . So the history of capitalism is full of
experiments which led nowhere: aborted revolutions, abandoned prototypes and all sorts of
monstrosities.89
In a similar fashion, Michel Aglietta argues: ‘[t]here is no royal road where the most
abstract concepts magically command the movement of society. There is rather a
89 Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles, p. 15. Emphasis mine.
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two-way process marked by frequent mishaps’.90 Here, Hegel’s idea of the maelstrom
of internal and external conditions is marshalled in order to explain the appearance
of successful states. Like Hegel and Marx before them, the regulationists argue that
a system founded on competing sovereignties ensures, to quote Lipietz, that the
‘history of capitalism is full of experiments’. State sovereignty makes certain that
each state of whatever size and constitution develops a somewhat diﬀerent combi-
nation of institutions and policies in response to changes in the environment of
accumulation. Often these changes, ‘experiments’ in regulation, have led, he notes, to
aborted monstrosities. But the sheer diversity of states of varying size, history and
location, creates possibilities otherwise absent in the capitalist system as a whole.
Regulation theory suggests, therefore, that wholesale changes in the nature of
capitalism impact in a variety of ways upon social formations, producing a plethora
of outcomes. Most of these ‘outcomes’, modes of regulation, prove to be ‘aborted
revolutions’. But in some cases, and for reasons that are diﬃcult to predict or
anticipate, these outcomes prove propitious to capitalist accumulation. Successful
experiments pull such states ahead. In the history of capitalism, economically
powerful states, particularly if they were suﬃciently sizeable and militarily powerful,
have tended to serve as models for emulation to others. Considering that historically
states have emulated each other by adopting successful techniques of governance and
control,91 the modern state is a product of such systemic emulation and innovation.92
When that happens, we recognise the emergence of a new regime of accumulation
with a corresponding mode of regulation. However, we should not confuse cause
with eﬀects: rather than assuming that such regime of accumulation is a necessary
historical outcome, ‘at best, we can adopt a posterior or almost metaphoric
functionalism’.93
Regimes of accumulation emerge, therefore, in the interaction between the general
capitalist tendencies, which are forces operating at a transnational level, and the
specific configuration of institutions and forces within each society. The international
realm ensures diversity and experimentation which creates the possibilities for
positive outcomes. That is why Aglietta maintains that that ‘[s]uch a study [i.e.
regulationism] demands knowledge of the general tendencies of capitalist develop-
ment within the diﬀerent nations, and careful attention to the relations between
states’.94
In a typical evolutionary manner, Aglietta chose the US example to study the rise
of Fordism. But, he warns, there was nothing inevitable about the rise of the US and
its place in the world after World War II. On the contrary, the foundations of the US
success were laid down in the nineteenth century and were largely internally
generated: ‘The US experienced a capitalist revolution from the civil war onwards,
the extension of the wage relations brought about a unification of the nation by its
own internal dynamic alone’.95 In time, however, the US emerged as a major
90 Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (London: NLB, 1979),
p. 66.
91 For discussion, see Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1965).
92 John U. Nef, War and Human Progress (London: Routledge, 1950). C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of
National States In Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).
93 Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles, p. 16.
94 Aglietta, Capitalist Regulation, p. 22.
95 Ibid., p. 22.
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capitalist power and began to shape the development of global capitalism. It was only
after World War II, that the US government launched a concerted and active policy
aimed at the ‘universalisation of its structural forms’96 and adopted hegemonic
policies. The hegemon, according to this perspective, is more of a product of
historical confluence of the international order than the originator and organiser of
an international order.
Conclusion. Towards a heterodox theory of international orders
This article has sought to identify the underlying shared premise, the cluster of
conclusions that are currently in search of a premise, that make up critical and
heterodox IR. I have argued that the critical tradition in IR is no longer concerned
only with the nature of peace and war, but rather has shifted towards a broader
conception of IR as a component of a transdisciplinary study of order and change.
The shift raises a number of important methodological points.
First, as a derivate discipline, IR scholars should develop greater awareness of first
order theories. This suggests, for instance, that we should put greater emphasis on
teaching our students the basic sociological theories of power, state, agency as well as
first order theories of political economy, linguistics and so on.
Second, as components of general theories of order and change, the diﬀerent
theories and approaches in IR must make clear whether their contribution to the
general theories are theoretically plausible. Attempts to ‘bolt on’ new themes or
processes upon an existing theoretical framework are likely to fail. Equally, theory
that may appear entirely plausible in IR, such as the realist theory, but which makes
extraordinary demands on state theory, is suspect. As indeed, are some of the radical
theories that assign an extraordinary degree of unity and purpose to the disparate
members of the ‘ruling classes’, often brushing aside legitimate concerns about the
diﬃculties of ‘collective action’.
Third, I have argued that IR should adopt Goran Therborn’s ideas for a good
research agenda and pursue an approach that is globally encompassing, historically
oriented, and focused on political institutions. Lastly, I have tried to demonstrate
that an evolutionary-institutionalist theory of global order, founded on these three
principles, is already on oﬀer albeit in a rather rudimentary format in the social
sciences.
What, then would an international dimension of a critical general theory of order
and change be? It appears to me that heterodoxy does not perceive the international
sphere as a system constituted in its own right, but tends to view it as a gigantic arena,
or a transmission belt, a huge communication device. The international dimension is
important, first and foremost, because it facilitates the transmission and diﬀusion of
ideas, practices, rules, norms and institutions throughout the world. It contributes
today, as it always has, to the transmission and diﬀusion of modernising practices
throughout the world.
The key theoretical question posed by such a perspective is whether the transmis-
sion of modernising practices throughout the world amounts to mere stochastic
96 Ibid., p. 22.
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processes, or alternatively, operates according to certain patterns. How does a state
system – if indeed it is a system – mediate the diﬀusion of modernising practices in the
world? What is the relationship between the sedimented, inherited institutions of our
time; primarily state and capital on the one hand, and power and politics, on the
other? These are the sort of questions that, it seems to me, should constitute the core
occupation of the discipline of International Relations today.
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